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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 17038 
CARAL LEE OWENS and RUDELL 
OWENS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
An Information filed against defendants Caral Lee Owens 
and Rudell Owens was quashed when Judge Allen B. Sorensen 
determined that the charging statute, Section 76-6-410(b), Utah 
Code Ann., (1953), as amended, was unconstitutionally vague. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 28, 1980, the State of Utah filed an Information 
against the defendants for violating Section 76-6-410(b), Utah 
Code Ann., (1953), as amended, and they were arraigned in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County. Defendants entered 
pleas of not guilty at the time and counsel for the defense was 
arant~n ten davs in which to file motions. On the 1st day of 
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April, 1980, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Quash. 
A hearing was held before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, 
Fourth Judicial District Court, in·and for Utah County, State 
of Utah, on April 4, 1980. The matter was argued, the Court 
took the matter under advisement and on that same date granted 
respondents'~ Motion to Quash. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State of Utah respectfully moves this Court to 
reverse the deci~ion of the Fourth Judicial District Court and 
find that Section 76-6-410(b), Utah Code Annotated is not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from a final order issued on April 4, 
1980, by Judge Allen B. Sorensen in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, Utah County, granting respondents'~ -Motion to Quash. That 
Court erroneously concluded that the language "gross deviation 
from the agreement" in the charging statute was unconstitutionally 
vague. 
The Information originally filed in this action charged 
respondents Caral Lee Owens and Rudell Owens with violating 
Section 76-6-410(b), Utah Code Annotated - theft by person having 
custody of property pursuant to repair to rental agreement. The 
State was prepared to present evidence showing that on May 18, 
1979, the respondents signed an agreement with James Butterfield 
-2-
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of Provo to rent from him a 16-foot trailer for a period of 
one month. On June 22, 1979, respondents rented another 
trailer again for a one-month period, but at the end of the 
month, rather than return the trailer, respondents phoned Mr. 
Butterfield and asked if they could keep the trailers for another 
month. He consented, but told them to send him some money 
to cover the rental period. They agreed to send him the money. 
The money never arrived and Mr. Butterfield did not hear from 
respondents again. In December of 1979, the respondents were 
picked up in another state and the trailers recovered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
ACTS OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE ARE 
ENTITLED TO A STRONG PRESUMPTION 
OF VALIDITY. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 
2066, 426 P.2d 13 (1967), set forth the following as preliminary 
consideration: 
The general rule of statutory 
construction is to hold an enactment of 
the legislature valid unless it clearly 
appears to violate some provision of 
the Constitution of this State or of 
the United States. 
See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, 99. 
Further, in State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 651 (1952): 
It is necessary that statutes should 
not be declared unconstitutional if there 
-3-
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is any reasonable basis upon which 
they may be sustained as falling within 
the constitutional framework ... and 
that a statute will not be held void 
for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, 
practical effect may be given it. 
And finally, in State v. Geurts, 350 P.2d 12 (1961): 
~ . . our conclusion is reinforced by 
the well known precept that any doubts 
must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. 
The doctrine of "void for vagueness" has evolved as 
the product of wisdom in search of ways to preserve human dignity. 
There is, in this case, no claim that a constitutional right 
of the defendant has been violated; no freedom of speech or 
religion violations; no freedom of association violations or other 
violations specifically guaranteed rights. Certainly the statute 
which serves as the legal basis f0r the information against 
defendant is not subject to ambiguous interpretation. 
POINT II: 
"GROSS DEVIATION" FROM THE AGREEMENT IS A 
PHRASE COMMONLY USED IN MODERN PENAL STATUTES 
WHICH PROSECUTE THE UNAUTHORIZED EXERCISE OF 
CONTROL OVER RENTAL PROPERTY AND SUCH STATUTES 
HAVE BEEN UPHELD IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
Oregon, New Hampshire, Maine and New York all have 
theft statutes that closely resemble Section 76-6-410, Utah 
Code Annotated. A common element of each state's statute is 
that a "rentor" can be held criminally liable for using rented 
property even where the property was once held pursuant to a 
valid agreement if: 1) the "rentor" intentionally withholds 
possession of the property; 2) without the consent of the 
owner; and 3) thab unauthorized retention of possession con-
stitutes a "gross deviation" from the rental agreement. High Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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courts in each of the states have recently considered cases 
involving violations of their unauthorized use of rental 
property statute and none have held the "gross deviation" 
language to be unconstitutionally vague. 
Both the Maine and the New Hampshire Supreme Courts 
have recently decided cases that involved theft of rented 
property. Although the constitutionality of the language in 
the statute was not an issue, neither Court had difficulty 
applying the statute. State v. Craney, 381 A 2d 630 (Me 1978), 
State v. Murgatroy, 349 A 2d 600 (NH 1975). 
The New York Supreme Court has had several opportunit-
ies to directly consider the "gross deviation" language and has 
never found the term too vague to apply to specific fact 
settings. People v. Lafler, 393 NY 2d 484 (1977), People v. Rici, 
410 NY S 2d 619 (1978). In each of these cases, the Court 
specifically dealt with violations of the statute that would 
require an application of the "gross deviation" standard. In 
neither instance did the Court confront any difficulties applying 
the statute so as to justify labeling the phrase unconstitutionally 
vague. 
The only state Court that has specifically confronted 
the issue whether "gross deviation from the agreement" is un-
constitutionally vague is the Court of Appeals of Oregon. In 
State v. Boyd, 560 P2d 689 (On. App. 1977), the lower Court 
-5-
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in Multnomah County held that O.R.S. 164-135(1) (c) was 
unconstitutionally vague. The State appealed and the Court of 
Appeals of Oregon reversed, finding that the statute was not 
unconstitutionally vague. That statute provided: 
(1) A person commits the crime of 
unauthorized use of a vehicle when: 
(a) He takes, operates, exercises 
control over, rides in or otherwise uses 
another's vehicle, boat or aircraft without 
the consent of the owner; or 
(b) Having custody of a vehicle, boat· 
or aircraft pursuant to an agreement between 
himself or another and the owner thereof 
whereby he or another is to perform for 
compensation a specific service for· the 
owner involving the maintenance, repair 
or use of such vehicle, boat or aircraft, 
he intentionally uses or operates it, 
without the consent of the owner, for his 
own purpose in a manner constituting a 
gross deviation from the agreed pu!pose; 
or 
(c) Having custody of a vehicle, 
boat or aircraft pursuant to an agreement 
with the owner thereof whereby such 
vehicle, boat or aircraft is to be re-
turned to the owner at a specified time 
he knowingly retains or withholds possession 
thereof without consent of the owner for so 
lengthy a period beyond the specified time 
as to render such retention or possession a 
gross deviation from the agreement. 
Despite appellent's arguments to the District Court, 
that the "gross deviation" language is unconstitutionally vague, 
there is no support for that conclusion in the decisions of the 
other states with similar statutes. On the contrary, the 
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language at issue has provided a fair and workable standard 
by which to determine the criminal nature of specific conduct. 
POINT III: 
THIS COURT HAS ENDORSED THE "GROSS 
DEVIATION" LANGUAGE BY APPLYING IT 
IN THE CONTEXT OF UTAH'S NEGLIGENCE 
STATUTE. 
Section 76-2-103, Utah Code Annotated provides: 
(3) Recklessly or maliciously, with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he is aware of but consciously disregards 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature 
and deg~ee that its disregard constitutes 
a gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is 
criminally negligent with respect to cir-
cumstances surrounding his conduct or the 
result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur. The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that the failure 
to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that 
an ordinary person would exercise in all 
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. (emphasis added). 
The language "gross deviation from the standard of 
care that an ordinary person would exercise" and that in 
Section 76-6-410(b) are remarkably similar. Both contemplate 
an expected standard of activity and a departure from that 
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expectation sufficient to constitute a gross deviation. Several 
times, in;recent years, this Court has decided cases involving 
the "gross deviation" language of Section 76-2-103. In each 
instance, this Court has demonstrated that a trier of fact 
could and did determine whether conduct of the defendant so 
varied from the accepted standard of performance as to 
constitute a "gross deviation." In none of these cases did 
this Court find that applying the term resulted in a denial of 
constitutional rights. 
State v. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah, 1978), was an 
appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Juvenile Court, 
Grand County, finding defendant guilty of aggravated assault. 
This Court affirmed the conviction. Reaching that decision, 
the Court specifically discussed the language of Section 
76-2-103(3), holding that the evdience supported defendant's 
convictione In State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (Utah, 1979), 
this Court reversed the defendant's conviction of automobile 
homicide and remanded with directions to instruct the jury 
on criminal negligence as the term is defined in Section 
76-2-103(4) rather than mere simple negligence. In reaching 
that conclusion, this Court reasoned that the "gross deviation" 
language required a higher degree of culpability than simple 
negligence implied: 
Section 76-2-103(4) ... requires proof 
that defendant's conduct placed another at 
_o_ 
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risk; that the risk be substantial 
and unjustifiable; and that failure to 
perceive the risk constitutes a 
gross (emphasis added by the Court) 
deviation from the reasonable man's 
standards. A higher level of culpability 
required under Section 76-2-103(4) than 
that defined in Instruction 18 (simple 
negligence). 
This Court's frequent application of the "gross 
deviation" language in defining negligence directly rebuts 
appellant's argument that the term is unconstitutionally vague. 
The term is a useful and practical standard by which the 
trier of fact can determine whether given conduct so far 
departs from a required course of action as to require imposition 
of criminal liability. 
POINT IV: 
"GROSS DEVIATION" IS A JUSTICIABLE 
PHRASE, CALCULATED TO GIVE A PERSON 
OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE A REASONABLE 
OPPORTUNITY TO KNOW WHAT IS PROHIBITED 
Defendants' brief asserts that the charging language 
of the information is so vague in defining the prohibited acts 
that it denies the defendants due process of law in violation 
of the test delineated by the Supreme Court in Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972), In that case, 
-9-
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the United States Supreme Court conclude-a that a constitutionally 
proper statute must: 
(1) "give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibied, so that he may act 
accordingly." (2) prevent "arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement" by providing 
explicit standards for those who apply the 
law, and (3) not inhibit the exercise of a 
person' a First Amendment .. freedoms. 
The facts alleged by the state, if proven, would appear 
to clearly constitute, as a matter of law, acts that a person of 
ordinary intelligence would know to be criminal and prohibited. 
The criminal acts in the area of rental property and rental 
agreements constitute such a wide range of possible fact 
situations that the only sensible method of defining the criminal 
activity is to use a general phrase of common understanding 
such as "gross deviation." Anything short of such an approach 
would present the risk of imposing criminal sanctions for a 
mere technical violation of a specific legal tenet in connection 
with a set of circumstances that are not criminal in nature when 
viewed in their totality. The "gross deviation" language merely 
assists the trier of fact in determining whether or not a criminal 
intent was formulated and a criminal act committed. 
In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 
808, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
. . • On the other hand, if the general 
class of offenses to which the statute 
is directed is plainly within its terms, 
the statute will not be struct down as 
vague even though marginal cases could be 
put where doubts might arise . . . and if 
this general class of offenses can be 
made constitutionally definite by a 
-10-
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reasonable construction of the statute, 
this Court is under a duty to give the 
statute that construction. 
Section 76-6-410(b), is a recodification of the former 
section 76-17-5, which read: 
Every person who has leased or 
rented a motor vehicle, trailer, 
appliance, equipment, tool, or other 
valuable thing, and who willfully fails 
to return the same to its owner within 
ten days after the lease or rental 
agreement has expired is guilty of 
embezzlement. 
The major difference between the above statute and 
Section 76-6-410(b) is that the latter imposes criminal liability 
only upon a finding that the intentional failure to return the 
property as promised constitutes a "gross deviation" from the 
agreement. The earlier statute provided that mere willful failure 
to return the property within ten days after the agreement has 
expired was a crime. Obviously, the legislature intended to 
allow the trier of fact the opportunity to look at more than just 
~he time of delay before reaching a decision as to the criminal 
nature of the breach. The comments regarding similar provisions 
in the Codes of other states are helpful in determining the 
rationale behind such a change. 
Recently the New York State Legislature provided a 
minimum standard of "gross deviation" from the agreement. That 
standard was intended to include, but not be limited to, situations 
where: 
. . . a person who having had custody 
of a vehicle for a period of fifteen days or 
less pursuant to a written agreement retains 
possession of such vehicle for at least seven 
days beyond the period specified in the 
agreement and continues such possession for Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a period of more than two days after 
service or refusal of attempted service 
of a notice in person or by certified 
mail at an address indicated in the 
agreement stating (i) the date and time 
at which the vehicle was to have been 
returned under the agreement; (ii) that 
the owner does not consent to the continued 
withholding or retaining of such vehicle 
and demands its return. . .. (N.Y~P.L. 
Section 165.05}. 
Although the New York Legislature retained the "gross 
deviation" language, the fact that it had provided a minimum 
standard concerned some commentators. Aware that the Courts of 
that state had successfully been applying the statute in the 
past, Arnold D. Hechtman expressed misgivings about the wisdom 
of providing a static measure when the ·statute as worded 
allowed the courts to consider all the circumstances surrounding 
a breach of an agreement before concluding that that breach rose 
to the level of a crime: 
Being cast in terms of a flat 
definition of gross deviation rather 
than as a presumption of gross deviation, 
the statute has now been burdened with a 
degree of inflexibility that may make it 
difficult for the trier of the facts to 
assess each case of overtime retention on 
its own peculiar facts. It is to be noted 
that only the short-term (i.e., over 15 
days) rentals or from other forms of 
agreements involving bailments with respect 
to an automobile, is subject to this 
definition. (Arnold D·. Hechtman, Supplementary 
Practice Commentary to N.Y.P.L. Section 165.05). 
The comments following Title 17-A Section 361 of the 
Maine Criminal Code indicate that the "gross deviation" language, 
attacked by defendants as unconstitutional, was intended to 
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provide increased fairness and due process for a person 
accused of theft of rented p~operty. The comments state: 
Subsection 1, paragraph B is designed 
to reach the garage mechanic who uses a 
vehicle left for repair as his own personal 
means of transportation. The use must, 
however, be more than minor, and must con-
stitute a "gross deviation" from the basic 
reason for the vehicle having been left to 
him. It is necessary to have some limit of 
this sort on the criminal liability created 
by this section, and the "gross deviation" 
limit serves to create a jury question on 
the issue so that all of the circumstances 
can be taken into account. (Comment, Me. 
C.C. 17-A, Section 360). 
Although defendant argues that the language of Section 
76-6-410(b) denies him due process of law, the apparent intent 
of the legislature and the effect of the statute is to do exactly 
the opposite. Under the former 76-17-5, a person could be found 
guilty of committing a crime for a mere ten-day delay in 
returning the rented property. The present statute allows the 
trier of fact to consider all of the circumstances surrounding 
the failure of the defendant to return the rental property. If 
the failure to return does not constitute a "gross deviation", 
then the defendant is not criminally liable. Section 76-6-410(b) 
thereby provides a more fair and rational basis upon which to 
determine criminal liability in given circumstances than did 
its predecessor. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
A "gross deviation from an agreement" is simply a 
criminal breach of that agreement. Defendants' arguments that 
they have been denied constitutional rights is without merit. 
The phrase is not unconstitutionally vague; contrarily, the 
phrase provides a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited. Such language has 
been upheld by the Courts of other states in criminal statutes 
regarding rental property and has been used and upheld in Utah 
in connection with statutes involving criminal negligence. 
For these reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court find that Section 76-6-41-0{b), Utah Code 
Annotated, is not unconstitutionally vague and reverse the 
decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
J County Attorney --fl~~/ \ vv.,J fd..., 
-·- STEVEN B. ILLPACK 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
-14-
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